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Introduction
Chronology 
The crisis of the breakup of Pakistan can be divided, in terms of U.S. participation, 
into roughly four major phases. The first began with the Pakistan army crackdown 
in the East Wing of Pakistan on the night of March 25/26, 1971.1 This followed a 
three-week period of civil disobedience and the exercise of de facto governmental 
power by the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The Awami League 
had won an overwhelming victory in the December 1970 election for the Con-
stituent Assembly, the climax of a movement towards greater autonomy for East 
Pakistan which began in 1954 or perhaps even earlier. The drive for autonomy was 
fueled by the economic, political and bureaucratic discrimination against East Ben-
gal by the West Pakistan-dominated central government, exacerbated by the West 
Pakistani belief (held particularly by the Punjabi-dominated military) that Bengalis 
were culturally and racially inferior. 
 The crackdown, in which Sheikh Mujib was captured and thousands of 
Bengalis were killed—students, Hindus, and members of the police and army, par-
ticularly—precipitated a full-scale civil war, a declaration of independence by the 
Awami League leaders who had fled to India, and, in the view of most observers 
within the State Department and without the inevitable breakup of Pakistan. As 
Tajuddin Ahmad, Prime Minister of the Awami League government-in-exile, put it 
in April, “Pakistan is now dead and buried under a mountain of corpses.”2 
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 The second phase of the crisis began with the announcement of Henry Kiss-
inger’s visit to Peking (July 15) and the signing of the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty 
(August 9). This phase featured the build-up of guerrilla forces (the Mukti Bahini) 
inside East Bengal, and the increase of direct and indirect Indian support, against 
the backdrop of a refugee population in India of nearly ten million by November. It 
ended with the outbreak of full-scale war between India and Pakistan on December 
3rd. 
 The third phase was the war, in which India, with the help of the Mukti 
Bahini, quickly defeated the Pakistan army in the East, and while fighting a hold-
ing action on the ground on the Western front, used air and naval power to damage 
Pakistan’s military capability. The final phase began with the transfer of power to 
Sheikh Mujib on January 12, 1972, and ended with U.S. recognition of Bangladesh, 
on April 4, 1972. 
Decision-Making and Rationales 
Virtually all the decisions made by the U.S. in this crisis originated in the White 
House. By and large, explicit rationales for those decisions were not communicated 
to State Department officials, still less to the Congress and the public. Since the 
end of the crisis, some rationales have been presented, most notably by President 
Nixon in his “State of the World” message to Congress of February 9, 1972, but 
what interviewees* agreed were the real reasons for U.S. policy have never been 
publicly stated. I will discuss some of those decisions in detail below, mentioning 
others only briefly because of lack of information and space. Having presented 
what I believe the rationales of each of these decisions were, I will move to a de-
tailed discussion divided into two parts: the facts of the case, and the implications. 
The study will conclude with a brief sketch of the implications of these decision 
cases taken together. 
 Those decisions I will discuss in detail are: 
(1) the decision not to comment on the initial “blood-bath” in East Bengal, 
and, later, the decision not to criticize Pakistan as the killing continued; 
(*) Much of the material in this study is drawn from interviews with government 
officials and private individuals, conducted in the summer of 1974. The line of ar-
gument presented is entirely my own, however, and when it is necessary to identify 
the source of a statement as an interview, an asterisk in parentheses is placed in the 
text, thus: (*). 
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(2) the decision to cut off most arms aid to Pakistan, while continuing to 
supply some; 
(3) the decision to provide humanitarian relief to refugees in India and to the 
people who stayed in East Bengal; 
(4) the decision to pursue a political solution of the crisis with the Paki-
stanis, the Indians, and the exiled Bengali leadership; 
(5) the decision first to attempt to prevent the outbreak of war between India 
and Pakistan and then to end it once it had begun. 
 The rationale for the first decision was that the civil war was an internal af-
fair of Pakistan; but the reason for not letting concern for violations of human rights 
override that principle was the “historical coincidence” that Pakistan was the inter-
mediary in the arrangement of the opening to China. These delicate negotiations, 
which were initiated in 19693 and had reached the stage of the exchange of notes 
via Pakistan by early 1971, became very serious on March 15th, and a specific 
invitation (in a sealed envelope) for either Kissinger or Rogers to visit China was 
conveyed by the Pakistan Ambassador some time before April 6th.4 Presumably 
the secrecy of the negotiations, and thus the opening itself,5 would have been jeop-
ardized by an “unfriendly” gesture to Pakistan at the very moment a breakthrough 
was achieved. 
 The reason for not criticizing Pakistan over the violent repression in East 
Bengal is tied to the generally favorable position vis-a-vis Pakistan that the U.S. 
adopted. As stated publicly, the pro-Pakistan “tilt” was meant to retain “leverage” 
with President Yahya Khan. It is likely that the desire to remain the friend to China’s 
friend contributed to the decision, as did the factor of President Nixon’s personal 
rapport with President Yahya, and his positive feeling towards Pakistan. (This fac-
tor has been emphasized by too many to be discounted, despite Kissinger’s remark 
that “I do not think we do ourselves any justice if we ascribe policies to the personal 
pique of individuals.”)6 
 The rationale for cutting off arms aid was simple: the Pakistan army was 
making use of them in a situation contrary to the agreement under which the U.S. 
supplied them. The reason for continuing a comparatively small flow of spare parts, 
etc. was symbolic and was tied to the general pro-Pakistan U.S. stance. The de-
cision to provide humanitarian relief needed no justification, but the proportions 
of aid given to India compared to aid earmarked for East Bengal underlined the 
White House position that humanitarian aid was to be the “centerpiece” of the U.S. 
political-diplomatic effort. 
 The “political solution” was juxtaposed to a military solution: if the U.S. 
and others did not succeed in getting a political settlement of the civil war, India 
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in one way or the other would see that Pakistan was broken up. The rationale was 
that the U.S. did not wish to see the breakup of Pakistan occur, especially with 
outside intervention, because that would “destabilize” the region. The need to pre-
serve Pakistan’s “integrity” was even greater in view of her alliance to the U.S. and 
friendship with China. 
 The decision to exercise U.S. influence first to prevent the outbreak of war 
between India and Pakistan and then to end it was of course justified on the ground 
that war is not a way to solve international disputes (a rationale which, it should 
be noted, the U.S. General Assembly agreed with by a vote of 104 to 11, with 10 
abstentions). A deeper rationale for the U.S. was that since India would win deci-
sively, the “destabilization” of the subcontinent would occur. Also, the defeat of a 
U.S. ally would place the U.S. in a weak position vis-a-vis the USSR in upcoming 
summit talks. This latter reason bulks very large during the war. And underlying 
the “tilt” which was made explicit during the war—i.e. the war should stop be-
cause Pakistan was losing it—is the personal factor of President Nixon’s attitude. In 
Kissinger’s words at the Washington Special Action Group (hereafter WSAG; the 
minutes constitute the bulk of the “Anderson Papers”) meeting, “. . . the President 
is not inclined to let the Paks be defeated.”7 
 Let me discuss briefly decisions on economic aid to Pakistan and on the 
recognition of Bangladesh. The focal points for Congressional action during the 
crisis were the Gallagher and Church/Saxbe amendments to the Foreign Aid Bill 
which would have cut off economic aid to Pakistan until the civil war ended. The 
administration not only opposed those amendments, it also dissented from the Aid-
Pakistan consortium recommendation to suspend aid to Pakistan (made in the wake 
of the leaked World Bank report which noted that the repression in East Bengal was 
so severe that economic aid could not be utilized there). Again, the rationale for this 
policy was to preserve leverage with the Pakistanis.8 
 Finally, there was a decision to delay the recognition of Bangladesh—the 
U.S. recognized Bangladesh on April 4, 1972, fully two months after most of the 
nations of Europe had extended recognition and nearly a month after Indian troops 
had left Bangladesh. No plausible rationale was ever given to the State Department 
(*), still less the Congress,9 but it was clearly tied to the China opening—President 
Nixon postponed considering it until after his trip to China (in late February 1972). 
Certainly, too, there was a desire to defer to Pakistan, even as the Muslim nations 
of the Middle East and Africa were doing. 
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Violent Repression; and the Register of Dissent 
The Facts 
After the crackdown on March 25/26, a decision was made to downplay the se-
riousness of the action and to avoid admitting to the facts of the “blood-bath.” In 
the initial phase of the civil war, there was, as Senator Kennedy said on the Senate 
floor on April 1, 1971, “indiscriminate killing, the execution of political leaders and 
students, and thousands of civilians suffering and dying every hour of the day.”10 It 
soon became clear from press reports that Hindus were being singled out for kill-
ing,11 and by June the London Sunday Times could use the title “Genocide” for its 
introduction to one of the best accounts of Pakistan army activities.12 Senator Ken-
nedy, in a news conference in New Delhi in August, called the Pakistan military 
action “genocide,”13 but that word was absent from debate by public figures both 
before and after August.14 
 The administration was even less willing to come to terms with the pos-
sibility that “genocide” was occurring in the later phase of the civil war than they 
had been willing to condemn the initial violence of March. The first indication of 
this stance was Washington’s resistance to the Dacca Consul-General’s decision to 
have Americans evacuated from Dacca in the first week of April (*), at a time when 
Pakistan was claiming that the situation had already returned to normal. According 
to Senator Kennedy, “instead of calling it an ‘evacuation’. . . the State Department 
reached into its bag of euphemisms and termed the exodus of Americans a normal 
‘thinning out’.”15 
 The U.S. issued a statement deploring the violence at the end of the first 
week of April, but one view is that that actually reported a decision not to pressure 
Pakistan because it was made so late, nearly two weeks after the crackdown. U.S. 
officials were reluctant to make public mention of the wide-spread killing or of the 
facts on actions which could be labeled “genocide.” Archer Blood, Consul-General 
in Dacca until early June, testified before Senator Kennedy’s subcommittee on refu-
gees on June 26th. Part of his testimony is worth quoting at length: 
SENATOR FONG: When the insurgents were put down, 
were there actions taken by the East Pakistan Army which 
forced the people to leave? 
MR. BLOOD: I don’t see any direct relationship between the 
level of insurgency and the flow of refugees. 
SENATOR FONG: Then why would the refugees leave? 
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MR. BLOOD: . . . And, subsequently, many Hindus have left 
because of the way they were treated. 
SENATOR FONG: Did many of them leave because they say 
conditions were imposed on the Hindus that they thought 
they couldn’t live with? 
MR. BLOOD: I assume so, yes. 
SENATOR FONG: What would those conditions be, sir? 
MR. BLOOD: I wouldn’t want to go into every detail, because we have 
reported this in the classified messages. . . . I would prefer not to answer in 
open session. . . .16 
 The official position was that the refugee outflow was due to continued 
fighting and the poor economic situation. U.S. efforts were thus aimed at stopping 
the “fighting” (between the Pakistan army and the Mukti Bahini guerrillas) not at 
stopping the killing of Hindus and the destruction of their property. Official policy 
plus the constraints of “cliency” make it most unlikely that “genocide” ever figured 
in any private communication with the Pakistan government.17 
 While the Dacca consulate was urging condemnation of the violence, sec-
onded by the New Delhi embassy, the Islamabad embassy discounted the reports 
from Dacca on the grounds that the consulate officials, being limited in their move-
ments, could only be getting “partial” reports (*). The fact that the Islamabad em-
bassy seemed to give greater credence to its Pakistan government sources than to 
its own officers in the field, despite close personal ties between the Deputy Chief 
of Mission and the Consul-General, must have hurt the morale of officers in Dacca. 
On the other hand, the Islamabad embassy protested on July 15 to the State Depart-
ment that field reports on predictions of possible famine in East Bengal were being 
denied in public statements in Washington.18 
 All interviewees agreed that the “tilt” policy position of the U.S. did not 
affect the reporting of facts to Washington. Even after it had surfaced, during the 
war, Consul-General Spivack cabled details19 of his and U.N. Assistant Secretary 
General Paul Marc Henry’s inspection of damage and bomb-rack fragments which 
indicated Pakistani responsibility for the bombing of the Dacca orphanage (which 
was blamed on India with much publicity). The Islamabad embassy sent in a report 
to Washington in which the Defense Representative to Pakistan and the Defense 
Attache questioned Spivack’s conclusion.20 
 The discounting of reports because of their tone and the presumed “cliency” 
bias of the drafters extended to the reporting of facts as well as to the presentation 
of estimates and advice on policy. (Ironically, the presumed cliency of Dacca begat 
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cliency in Islamabad.) But the professionalism of the Foreign Service dictated that 
the reporting of facts known to be unpalatable not stop. 
Implications 
 The maintenance of contact with the Pakistanis, both in the context of the 
opening to China and with a view towards exerting “leverage” in the future (once 
the situation in the East had become clear), was clearly a matter of great impor-
tance. One non-U.S. source, who discussed the findings of the leaked World Bank 
report of July with Yahya Khan, says the Pakistan President could not credit its 
finding that official violence had and was occurring in East Pakistan. The result of a 
U.S. decision to raise the question of “genocide” might thus have resulted in cutting 
off communication with the Pakistanis (and especially with Yahya Khan) rather 
than in changing Pakistan’s policies. 
 Most sources agreed that almost everyone at the State Department recog-
nized what was going on in East Bengal and would have liked to see if not a U.S. 
condemnation at least a dissociation of the U.S. from the Pakistan regime. The facts 
reached the policy-makers in the White House, although there is some difference of 
opinion on how forceful and articulate the presentation of State Department views 
were; according to one official, lower levels of State felt it could have been much 
better, but according to Marvin and Bernard Kalb, Assistant Secretary of State Sis-
co “battled” with Kissinger in WSAG meetings in December.21 
 Those within the system were apparently satisfied with the channels of dis-
sent open to them. “Official informal” letters were seen by my sources as having 
considerable importance in making an impact on policy decisions in most cases 
(in part because they are considered leak-proof, and the leaks of dissent positions 
seemed to distress the dissenters as much as anyone), but it was implied, not in this 
crisis, because policy was being made beyond the reach of the “official informal.” 
 No one who dissented from the U.S. policy in this crisis resigned. It would 
not be necessary or desirable for an FSO to threaten to resign whenever he objected 
strongly to a decision. But if the forceful presentation of policy alternatives is con-
sidered desirable, it might be worthwhile to make it easier for the FSO to leave the 
Service, by training him during his career so that he could enter a different career 
(e.g. university teaching, international business), or by bringing in people from 
outside the Service into middle-level slots. 
 Finally, the existence of career sub-cultures, FSOs with academic interests, 
for example, can provide sub-communities of knowledgeable professionals who 
can informally sustain the dissenter in responsible dissent. There is some evidence 
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that the South Asia specialists—encompassing both India and Pakistan “wallahs”—
constituted such a sub-community in 1971. 
The Arms Aid Cut-Off Decision; and the Use of Public Statements 
The Facts 
A decision was made to cut-off the supply of arms to Pakistan. In a letter to Senator 
Kennedy, dated April 20, 1971, David Abshire, Assistant Secretary for Congressio-
nal Relations, wrote, “we have been informed by the Department of Defense that 
[no non-lethal military end items (of) spare parts and ammunition have] been pro-
vided to the Pakistan Government or its agents since the outbreak of fighting in East 
Pakistan on March 25-26, and nothing is presently scheduled for such delivery.”22 
But “delivery” here meant that items contracted for and licensed for export before 
March 25 were considered “delivered” even though they had not left U.S. shores. 
This continued movement of arms to Pakistan was revealed in a New York Times 
article—presumably as the result of a leak—while the Indian Foreign Minister was 
returning from Washington to Delhi with what he thought were assurances that 
Pakistan was not receiving U.S. arms. These events contributed to Indian distrust 
of the U.S. (which became crucial in U.S. attempts to prevent a war; see below). 
 A General Accounting Office report, released on February 4, 1972,23 re-
vealed that not only had $3.8 million worth of Munitions List articles been exported 
under valid licenses, but also “Department of Defense agencies, despite depart-
mental directives issued in April, continued to release from their stocks spare parts 
for lethal end-items” and “the U.S. Air Force delivered to Pakistan about $563,000 
worth of spare parts between March 25 and mid-July 1971 on a priority basis us-
ing the Military Airlift Command. Some of these spare parts were needed to place 
inoperable aircraft, such as F-104’s, into operable condition.”24 It was discovered 
in late August that until the practice was stopped by informal order on July 2nd 
and formally on August 12th, “military departments” entered into foreign military 
sales contracts of about $10.6 million with Pakistan. . .,”25 though no licenses were 
issued for these contracted items. On November 8th, the State Department revoked 
all outstanding licenses (for goods worth about $3.6 million) and the flow of arms 
to Pakistan ended. 
 There were several factors at work here. On one level, there was something 
of a bureaucratic “snafu” (*) in the instances of continued spare parts supply. This 
might of course be interpreted as deliberate effort on the part of Defense agencies 
to continue supplying a country they considered to be a good ally. The “business 
as usual” signing of new contracts was justified as proper because U.S. military 
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supply policy was “under review.” If the continued supply under valid licenses had 
been a “snafu” in which State Department and Defense Department signals had got-
ten crossed, then presumably shipments would have ceased when it was revealed 
in late June. But the licenses were not revoked until November—and Kissinger 
wondered aloud in the WSAG meetings whether that step had been wise—making 
it clear that the supply of a limited amount of arms to Pakistan had been U.S. policy. 
Christopher van Hollen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for NEA, in testimony before 
Senator Kennedy’s sub-committee on October 4, made U.S. policy explicit: 
SENATOR FONG: The administration did not feel it should revoke the 
licenses that had been issued? 
MR. VAN HOLLEN: That is correct. The judgment was made that this 
would be a political sanction, and that it would not be in keeping with our 
efforts to maintain a political relationship with the Government of Pakistan, 
looking towards the achievement of certain foreign policy objectives of the 
United States.26 
 That is, these arms shipments were continued as part of U.S. attempts to 
maintain “leverage” on Pakistan. 
 During the December war, Jordan and possibly other countries offered to 
transfer U.S. supplied weapons to Pakistan. The question was discussed in two of 
the WSAG meetings whose minutes were leaked. State Department and Defense 
Department officials pointed out that it would be illegal for the U.S. to permit third 
country transfers, since the U.S. itself was barred from supplying arms to Pakistan. 
Kissinger, however, asked that King Hussein be kept in a “holding pattern,” noting 
that the President “may want to honor” requests from Pakistan for military aid of 
this kind.27 It was later reported that “military sources” disclosed that Libya and 
Jordan had indeed provided aircraft to Pakistan.28 
Humanitarian Assistance; and the Role of Congress 
The Facts 
One interviewee told me that in August the President described the relief effort— 
which would be carried on, no matter what, for humanitarian reasons—as the cen-
terpiece of the U.S. political effort vis-a-vis Pakistan. This view of U.S. policy was 
however not conveyed downward even to middle-level State Department officers. 
The decision was to provide aid both to the refugees in India and to those in the East 
(especially in the cyclone-affected areas) who did not leave. The threat of famine 
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would be met and India’s burden would be shared. Congress, on the other hand, 
wanted to give more aid for refugee relief than the administration requested, and 
less to the people in East Pakistan, on the grounds that with a crippled transport sys-
tem and the acknowledged diversion of some relief supplies and transport vehicles 
to the Pakistan army, there was no guarantee that such aid would reach those for 
whom it was intended.29 
 The amount of U.S. assistance was consistently overstated by U.S. spokes-
men, including the President, even after the crisis was over. A GAO report of June 
29, 1972, listed authorized contributions for victims in India as $94.5 million, and 
pointed out that of the $276.7 million authorized for victims in Pakistan (and this 
included “old” money intended specifically for pre-March cyclone damage relief 
and normal bilateral food aid), $201.2 million (73 per cent) was not implemented. 
The repeated U.S. assertion that the U.S. was contributing “more than the rest of 
the world combined”—a formulation the Delhi embassy finally gave up protesting 
(*)—appears to have been a self-serving public relations effort. The World Bank’s 
estimate of the cost of refugee relief to India was $700 million by March 1972 
(India claimed in the U.N. debate in December that she was spending “3 million a 
day); the U.S. thus would contribute about 15 per cent of the total and the “rest of 
the world” about the same or more,30 leaving India with nearly 70 per cent of the 
cost of refugee relief. 
 There was, moreover, a coordination of public utterance in this instance. 
Another GAO report (of April 20, 1972, but requested in July 1971 by Senator Ken-
nedy) stated in the introduction: 
Our review efforts were impeded by Department of State and AID officials. 
They withheld and summarized records prior to our access and thereby lim-
ited information needed for a complete and thorough report. In connection 
with the GAO review, U.S. Embassy officials in Islamabad were instructed 
not to make available messages reporting on sensitive discussions with the 
GoP [Government of Pakistan], Government of India, or U.N. agencies, or 
certain sensitive documents relating to development of U.S. policy. 
Implications 
The U.S. relief effort provided a major focus for Congressional attention to the 
1971 crisis. While the GAO, an arm of the Congress, was having difficulty in con-
ducting its investigation, Senator Kennedy was able to get copies of confidential 
cables from Pakistan. Congressional sources I spoke with seemed satisfied with the 
institutional arrangements in the foreign policy field, arguing that the lack of Con-
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gressional activity during the crisis (the Foreign Relations Committee never held 
a public hearing, for example) reflected not the lack of power or expertise but the 
lack of Congressional interest in foreign policy and especially vis-a-vis South Asia. 
 The Congressional concern with humanitarian issues reflected the U.S. 
public perception of the problem—a record amount of money was contributed to 
refugee relief from private sources— but Congress had little impact in the face of a 
U.S. policy which sought first to downplay the refugee issue, then to shift the focus 
of concern from refugees and from “genocide” to East Pakistanis suffering because 
of civil strife (cause unspecified), and finally, to overstate the amount of U.S. as-
sistance. 
The Political Solution; and the “Checklist” Danger 
The Facts 
President Nixon in his “State of the World” message of February 9, 1972, called 
“the problem of political settlement between East and West Pakistan,” “the basic 
issue of the crisis.”31 In May, in letters to President Yahya and Prime Minister Gan-
dhi, President Nixon referred to the necessity of a “political accommodation,”32 by 
summer, this was communicated to “all parties” as being a political solution “on the 
basis of some form of autonomy for East Pakistan.”33 
 During August, September and October, eight contacts with the “Bangla-
desh people” in Calcutta were made, according to Kissinger.34 And, according to 
President Nixon, by early November, President Yahya told us he was prepared to 
begin negotiations with any representatives of this group not charged with high 
crimes in Pakistan, or with Awami League leaders still in East Pakistan.”35 One 
interviewee felt that the contacts were a “sterile exercise” and another felt that they 
were not serious, since follow-up cross-checks were discouraged by Washington. 
The difficulty here was perhaps differing perceptions of what the contacts meant. 
 These contacts were to lead to negotiations between Pakistan “and Bangla-
desh representatives approved by Mujibr,” according to Kissinger.36 The negotia-
tions never began, nor was the U.S. ever involved “on substance.”37 The next step 
was to establish contact with Mujib to get his approval of Awami League negotia-
tions, and Kissinger claimed that the U.S. “had the approval of the Government 
of Pakistan to establish contact with Mujib through his defense lawyer,” and that 
India had been so informed.38 Prime Minister Gandhi, however, wrote to President 
Nixon on December 15th that “there was not even a whisper that anyone from the 
outside world had tried to have contact with Mujibur Rahman.”39 And Ambassador 
Keating, reacting to the news of Kissinger’s backgrounder, pointed out that a move 
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to contact Mujib had been rebuffed on December 2nd, and the initiative had been 
suggested on November 29th40 (one week after the war had begun, by President 
Nixon’s account).41 
 The negotiations, President Nixon admits, were to be with those not charged 
with “high crimes,”—i.e., the entire top leadership of the Awami League. Given 
the gap between “contacts” (the latest in October) and the attempted contact with 
Mujib (end of November), one can understand the belief that it was all a “sterile 
exercise.” 
 There is also some doubt in another area, the proposal for a timetable for 
East Pakistan’s autonomy. The U.S. claim was that “in mid-November, we informed 
India that we were preparing to promote discussion of an explicit timetable for Each 
Pakistani autonomy.”42 Kissinger told the press, “we told the Indian Ambassador . 
. . that we were prepared to discuss with them . . . a precise timetable for the estab-
lishment of political autonomy in East Bengal.”43 Ambassador Keating, relying on 
the news report, pointed out that he had not been informed of this “critical fact” 
that “Washington and Islamabad were prepared” to discuss the timetable (emphasis 
added).44 But it seems clear from another remark by Kissinger that the U.S. was 
seeking a timetable from India;45 he also said “[India] knew that we believed that 
political autonomy was the logical outcome of a negotiation. . . .”46 Prime Minister 
Gandhi indeed wrote that “the United States recognized that . . . unquestionably in 
the long run Pakistan must acquiesce in the direction of greater autonomy for East 
Pakistan. . . .”47 There is no indication, however, that any timetable for political 
autonomy (which went beyond the scheduled restoration of civilian government 
in East Pakistan) was presented to Pakistan, or that the U.S. had publicly favored 
autonomy in a form acceptable to the Awami League. 
 Many officials, both in Delhi and Islamabad, believed by April that Pakistan 
would break up, and this assessment was supported by the intelligence community 
(*). Those in Islamabad felt that direct Indian intervention would be inevitable 
while those in the Delhi embassy felt that the guerrillas would succeed on their own 
(*). An interim solution of autonomy leading to independence was not ruled out as 
unacceptable to the Bengalis (and to India, who did not recognize an independent 
Bangladesh until December 6, despite considerable internal political pressure). 
Whether such a facade would have been acceptable to Pakistan is questionable. The 
Pakistan government’s qualified amnesty, its willingness to accept a limited U.N. 
role, and the return of East Pakistan to “civilian rule” under a man totally unaccept-
able to the Bengalis—all pointed to as significant steps by President Nixon— were 
dismissed by the Awami League. The proposal to station 
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 U.N. observers on the border was called a “non-starter” by the Delhi em-
bassy (*). Ambassador Keating dismissed the amnesty proposal in only slightly less 
direct terms.48 
Implications 
Ambassador Keating concluded his December 8th cable by implying that he real-
ized he might not have been informed of some of the specific developments men-
tioned in the story of Kissinger’s backgrounder. Several interviewees agreed that 
no “political solution” was pressed on Pakistan until very late, and none could 
say what that solution was. If indeed it was formulated as a package by the White 
House, it was certainly not presented as such to the State Department. The proper 
presentation of alternative policy proposals was frustrated in this instance by the 
lack of policy guidance. State Department officials seemed to have had no idea that 
the White House felt it was pressing a coherent strategy towards getting a political 
solution, and was forced to react to proposals piecemeal. 
 There is a danger inherent in compiling a “policy checklist” and then ticking 
off items as they are accomplished (or partially accomplished), because one has the 
illusion that the policy, overall, is then “working.” The U.S. managed to get Yahya 
to agree to a series of steps—maybe the civilian government was not acceptable to 
the Awami League, but at least it was a civilian government; may be Mujib would 
not get a public trial and would not be permitted to participate in negotiations, but 
at least he was alive; maybe the amnesty was less than complete, but at least Yahya 
had accepted the idea in principle; etc.—and the President and Mr. Kissinger ap-
parently felt that progress was being made. And so they were angry (if not furious) 
with India for not giving Pakistan time to come to accept a political solution in such 
terms. But it was obvious to many officials at State that these steps came far, far 
too late to provide the basis for a solution; that satisfying a number of items on the 
checklist did not constitute a viable policy or strategy of action. 
 The review process in charting policy progress must be constant: whether 
an objective has been achieved “too late” is the kind of judgment that demands 
considerable reliance on the area experts (centered on the Country Director), who 
have a feel for the political parameters of a situation. High-level decision-makers, 
especially in the White House, have neither the time nor the expertise to develop 
such judgment adequately. In this instance, apparently, the White House relied on 
its own judgment, and wound up pressing for a solution which the Bengalis would 
have accepted before March 25th but which would not do in the fall of 1971. The 
White House belief that the U.S. could play the role of honest broker seemed to 
fly in the face of Indian distrust of U.S. motives and allegiance; area experts in the 
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State Department, who did keep the situation under review, were not so sanguine. 
To the extent that the White House belief that a political solution was aborted by 
Indian actions influenced U.S. policy during the December war and after, this in-
stance points to the failure of a White House centered system. 
Prevention of War; and Policy-Making Crisis by Crisis 
The Facts 
The danger of India going to war against Pakistan was clear from the first phase of 
the crisis. On May 28, President Nixon wrote to both President Yahya and Prime 
Minister Gandhi urging “restraint” and warning of the danger of war.49 In the sec-
ond phase of the crisis (August-November), it seemed to be only a matter of time 
before war broke out. U.S. policy was to urge restraint on India and Pakistan, as 
part of a diplomatic effort which included humanitarian relief and the effort to bro-
ker a political solution. Specific suggestions focused on a disengagement of Indian 
and Pakistani troops from East Pakistan borders, and the U.S. supported a Pakistani 
proposal that U.N. observers be posted on the border. India rejected these moves 
on the grounds that the threat of war arose from the situation in East Bengal, not 
border confrontations. 
 When the war broke out on December 3rd, President Nixon apparently felt 
that India had not given the U.S. time to achieve a solution to the crisis, and that 
India was thus the “aggressor.” As the war developed, officials from the U.S. am-
bassador to the U.N. on down followed instructions to “tilt” in favor of Pakistan. 
The minutes of the WSAG meeting reveal that from the outset no one believed that 
India would halt until she had achieved an independent Bangladesh, resolutions in 
the U.N. calling for a ceasefire notwithstanding. The focus of attention in WSAG 
was the halting of the war against West Pakistan. President Nixon reported in Feb-
ruary that “during the week of December 6, we received convincing evidence that 
India was seriously contemplating the seizure of Pakistan-held portions of Kashmir 
and the destruction of Pakistan’s military forces in the West. We could not ignore 
this evidence. Nor could we ignore the fact that when we repeatedly asked India 
and its supporters for clear assurances to the contrary we did not receive them.”50 
He continued, “if we had not taken a stand against the war, it would have been pro-
longed and the likelihood of an attack in the West greatly increased. . . . The war 
had to be brought to a halt.”51 
 The means to this end that President Nixon mentioned was the United Na-
tions, but it is not implausible that the U.S. did threaten to cancel the upcoming 
U.S.-USSR summit unless the Russians put pressure on India to stop. The sending 
14
Oldenburg
of the Enterprise task force into the Bay of Bengal, after the war in the East was 
won, has been interpreted as a signal to the USSR and to Pakistan that the U.S. 
would not let an ally “go under.”52 
 An important aspect of this case is the seeming gap in communication be-
tween India and the U.S. The U.S. urged “restraint” on India; India would say “yes, 
but only when the Pakistan army in East Bengal shows ‘restraint’.” More directly, 
after Mrs. Gandhi’s trip to Washington in early November, during which she repeat-
edly said that India was nearing the end of her tether, she said that reports “that she 
and President Nixon found no common ground in their talks are entirely correct.”53 
The U.S. standing vis-a-vis India, and the influence it could hope to exercise was 
off course seriously undercut by the clear U.S. commitment to an undivided Paki-
stan and its unwillingness to condemn Pakistani excesses. 
 Another instance of communications breakdown: President Nixon claimed 
that no assurances denying the report of Indian intentions to seize Pakistan-held 
Kashmir had been received. The CIA report which I infer had touched this of held 
that Mrs. Gandhi intended to “straighten out the southern border off Azad [Pakistan 
held] Kashmir,” and to “eliminate Pakistan’s armor and air force capabilities.”54 In 
the WSAG meeting of December 8, however, Assistant Secretary Sisco reported 
that India’s “Foreign Minister Singh told Ambassador Keating that India has no 
intention of taking any Pak territory.”55 And in a public statement in New York on 
December 12th, Singh said India had no wish to “destroy Pakistan.”56 But, as Sisco 
also pointed out, “Kashmir is really disputed territory.”57 On balance, he doubted 
that India had any intention of breaking up West Pakistan. 
 President Nixon apparently wanted more ironclad assurances; the State De-
partment spokesman reported on December 15th that “India has not replied to U.S. 
request for assurances it will not attack West Pakistan after defeating Pakistan in 
the East.”58 (General Niazi, the commander of the Pakistan army in the East, had 
asked the U.S. to convey his request for a ceasefire on the morning of December 
14th, Washington time). It is difficult to understand why Washington expected In-
dia not to attack while Pakistan continued to wage war in the West. Even before the 
outbreak of the war, on December 2nd, Mrs. Gandhi said: “If any country thinks 
that by calling us aggressors it can pressure us to forget our national interests, then 
that country is living in its own paradise and is welcome to it.”59 In the event, Presi-
dent Yahya only agreed to the Indian ceasefire offer under pressure (*). Yahya’s 
broadcast to the nation, delivered four hours before the ceasefire was announced, in 
which he spoke of a fight to victory, suggests that the ceasefire was indeed hard to 
accept. Here, as in much of the crisis, the U.S. misunderstood both the Indian posi-
tion and, probably, the intensity of Pakistani feeling. 
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Implications 
Communication and contact between the countries involved were not impeded by 
cliency—the unwillingness to carry unpleasant messages to the government con-
cerned, e.g., as it had been in the 1965 war, when Ambassador Bowles was said 
to have shown such reluctance—nor by any other organizational constraint. There 
may well have been failures in communication at even the most rudimentary level: 
misunderstanding Pakistani English usage, for example (*). More important is the 
apparent belief that conveying a message means that the recipient has digested its 
meaning. This dichotomy is neatly illustrated by the words of an American official 
in Islamabad, speaking around November 20: “we’ve been in it up to our necks—
making suggestions, talking privately with Yahya and others night and day—but 
this is a closed society. They don’t pay any attention—there’s no flexibility left. We 
no longer have any reason to expect the Pakistanis to behave.”60 One suspects that 
India and Pakistan had similar difficulties in conveying their position to American 
officials. 
 There are two facets of the communication problem which relate to the U.S. 
effort to prevent a war. (1) The problem of ambiguity in statements and intentions, 
and the possibilities of “weathervaning” in analysis which this opens up, and (2) the 
variant definitions of the size and time dimensions of the “crisis” itself. 
 President Nixon and Henry Kissinger were apparently unsatisfied with In-
dian assurances because of the ambiguity inherent in any interpretation of a domes-
tic political situation— they overestimated the importance of Indian “hawks” like 
Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram, in this instance—and in the less than sweeping 
nature of the assurances received (which were, to be sure, perfectly understandable 
from the Indian standpoint). Ambiguity can be used as a tool, however: Kissinger 
emphasized in the WSAG meeting of December 8th that “we cannot afford to ease 
India’s state of mind” presumably about U.S. intentions to come to Pakistan’s assis-
tance.61 Ambassador Keating had made it clear to Indian officials that third country 
transfers of weapons required U.S. approval and was told by Under Secretary of 
State John Irwin, on Kissinger’s orders, “in view of intelligence reports spelling 
out military objectives in West Pakistan, we do not want in any way to ease Gov-
ernment of India’s concerns regarding help Pakistan might received from outside 
sources.”62 Again, there is no reason to believe that India or Pakistan would not 
pursue their foreign policy vis-a-vis the U.S. by using the same technique. 
 Although, as noted above, interviewees agreed that the reporting of facts 
to the highest levels was not restricted, I was told that there was “weathervaning” 
in analysis: the preferences of the top levels were fed back to them. The ambiguity 
which is inherent in the communications between nations—and to a degree within 
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one nation’s foreign service—opens the way to anticipatory compliance in report-
ing and analysis that does not compromise professional responsibilities. 
 The second facet of the communication problem here has to do with the 
dimensions of the crisis and ideas of crisis management. The U.S. treated the threat 
of war and its outbreak as a separable crisis amenable to what one interviewee 
called the “standard crisis manual” which says “first, urge restraint; second, get the 
fighting stopped; third, get the parties talking.” India’s position was that the crisis 
of a threat of Indo-Pakistan war could not be and should not be separated from the 
overall crisis which began on March 25th. 
 U.S. policy towards South Asia was very much a crisis by crisis affair. From 
the U.S. point of view, “the crisis” did not mean the totality of events in 1971 (as 
it did for India and Pakistan), but rather a series of interrelated crises, like the war. 
Officials were taking up new posts in the summer of 1971, as is usual, and though 
the overall crisis was relatively subdued—no headlines, just one constant stream of 
refugees—they did not go into the details of previous “crises.” Nor were the ex-in-
cumbents sought out when new “crises” or decisions were encountered. Familiarity 
with the current file, coupled with overall expertise, was believed to be sufficient. 
 In 1971, decisions were made at the White House. During the “smaller” 
crises—the initial crackdown, the first realization of the magnitude of the refugee 
flow, the December war, etc.—raw intelligence reports and reports of facts direct 
from the field reached the highest policy-making level and probably were read. 
During the less active phases, analytic reports warning of the danger of continued 
armed violence against Hindus by Muslims reached that level (*), but there is little 
reason to believe that it made an impact. By the time of the crisis of the war, Indian 
motives might well have been difficult to descern or appreciate. A problem in an 
area like South Asia, which is a low priority in U.S. national interest terms, has to 
be more serious than in other areas before it reaches a “crisis” level, and the failure 
to appreciate the dimension of the crisis from the point of view of the other parties 
is exacerbated by the tendency to shift not only decision making but also analysis 
to levels in which expertise is severely limited. It is hardly surprising that the U.S. 
failed to head off war on the Indian subcontinent in 1971. 
Conclusions 
From the point of view of the White House, I suspect, U.S. policy in South Asia in 
1971 was a qualified success. The key goal of the opening to China was not jeop-
ardized by events on the South Asian subcontinent. The progress towards detente 
with the USSR was not harmed, and valuable lessons were learned on how effective 
ties with the Soviet Union could be. Relations with Pakistan remained firm, with 
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all that meant for U.S. flexibility in the Middle East (recall that Middle Eastern 
nations, by and large, gave Pakistan considerable support during 1971). Relations 
with India were none too good to begin with; a further deterioration could be borne 
with equanimity, with the added thought, perhaps, of letting the Russians enjoy that 
headache for a while. Bangladesh and Sheikh Mujib—with whom the U.S. had had 
close ties— might well want U.S. friendship and aid to counterbalance India and 
the USSR. 
 On the other hand, of course, Pakistan had been reduced in power, though 
India’s military development since 1965 precluded a position of parity for Pakistan 
in any case. A nation state, in ally, had been dismembered by its neighbor, but Paki-
stan was, in the view of some observers, doomed from its birth, and in the view 
of others, better off without the drain East Pakistan was becoming. Vigorous U.S. 
opposition to the war had been concurred in by almost all the nations of the world, 
and especially Third World nations. The U.S. was vilified in moral terms both at 
home and abroad, but in the context of the war in Vietnam (which was to be ended, 
after all, with the help of new relations with China and U.S.—USSR detente), that 
was hardly unusual. Moral outrage evaporates while national interests remain; even 
India would come around eventually. 
 But couldn’t U.S. policy have been better? (In both senses of the word: 
couldn’t the opening to China have been achieved without the costs incurred in 
South Asia, and with the U.S. supporting a democracy instead of yet another mili-
tary regime, condemning officially sanctioned violence against the civilian popula-
tion and making every effort to get it stopped?) And would a different organiza-
tional structure have made any difference? 
 There were, on the whole, no problems in the flow of information upward, 
nor in the carrying out of instructions from the White House. There is no indication 
that President Nixon or Kissinger felt any lack in the information they received or 
in the responsiveness of officials in Washington or in the field (with the exception 
of Kissinger’s famous remark in the WSAG meeting that he was “getting Hell from 
the President every half hour” because State Department officials were not “tilting” 
sufficiently towards Pakistan).63 
 There were, however, severe restrictions in the flow of information down-
ward. Rationales for policy never reached lower levels of State. Similarly, the up-
ward flow of analysis and advice was impeded because it had to be considered 
irrelevant. Until July 15, when the China opening was announced, the State Depart-
ment was working in the dark—receiving no guidance on what the reasons for U.S. 
policy were and sending up analysis and policy advice which had to be ignored, 
since it could not confront the real rationale. Even after July 15, rationales for U.S. 
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policy which took account of the China opening were not spelled out, and so mean-
ingful alternatives could not be presented. 
 The secrecy of the rationale for U.S. policy meant that there was no one oth-
er than President Nixon and Kissinger who could make decisions, even on minor 
matters. They were the only ones able to monitor effectively the implementation of 
the decision, and they alone could assess its impact in terms of the goals they had 
set. But they also did not have the time (or the expertise) to perform those tasks 
well—the delay in the recognition of Bangladesh is a case in point. 
 Alternatives to policy were not presented effectively to decision-makers in 
the White House, as might be expected under the circumstances. Those sending up 
proposals were unaware of the “global strategy” which determined U.S. decisions. 
Moreover, their proposals would inevitably be framed in terms of U.S. 
policy towards the region or to one country or the other, and would be discounted 
accordingly. Ultimately, the serious consideration of bilateral and regional dimen-
sions of policy while global objectives are pursued—sorely needed as the U.S. 
dealt with South Asia in 1971—depends most on having a President or Secretary of 
State willing and able to work with knowledgeable professionals and with organi-
zational arrangements that effectively represent them. 
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